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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20030310-CA

ALEX MONTIEL, a/k/a
JULION CEZAR RAMON-DURAN
Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for aggravated robbery, a first degree felony.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the "pour-over" provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 2002).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Did the trial court commit plain error in rejecting a plea agreement
which represented a significant reduction in the charge, and, thus, the
defendant's potential sentence, where the prosecutor had not discussed
the plea with the victim?
Because defendant did not preserve this claim below, this Court should review
them only for plain error. To establish plain error, defendant must show that (1) the trial
court erred; (2) the error should have been obvious; and (3) the error was prejudicial. See
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (1993).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following rules of criminal procedure are relevant to this appeal and
reproduced at Addendum A:
Utah R. Crim. P. 11;
Utah Const, art. I, § 28;
Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-37-3, 77-38-3, 77-38-4 (1999 & Supp. 2003).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On May 14, 2002, defendant was charged by amended information with one count
of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302
(Supp. 2001) (R. 135-136). The information included notice of an enhanced penalty
because the offense was committed in concert with two or more persons. Id.
Before trial, the trial court rejected a plea agreement in which the prosecutor and
defendant agreed to amend the information to charge a third degree felony (R. 200:4-7).
After a three-day trial, the jury found defendant guilty as charged (R. 165-166; R.
203:31). Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than ten years in
the Utah State Prison (R. 172-173). Defendant timely appealed (R. 181-182).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The crime. Sometime after 10:30 p.m. on January 26, 2002, defendant, who is
also known as Delinquent, robbed Eric Contreras at gunpoint while a group of
defendant's friends helped him (R. 202:16, 17, 34, 53-55, 94).
That night, Contreras was with his friend, Edwin Rivas. R. 202:12, 49. While
driving through the parking lot of the Excalibur dance club, Contreras saw another friend,
2

Sandra Palacios, who asked for a ride to Sandra Cortez's house (R. 202:12, 13-14, 27,
51).
Upon arriving at Cortez's house, Palacios and Contreras got out of the car and
were talking (R. 202: 52). Then, a blue Ford Thunderbird pulled up behind Rivas's car,
and five or six Latino males, including defendant, got out (R. 202: 26, 52-53).
Palacios, who was defendant's girlfriend, approached the new arrivals (R. 202:52).
Contreras got back into Rivas's car (R. 202:53).
A short while later, one of the males from the Ford Thunderbird opened
Contreras's door and told Contreras to get out (R. 202: 15, 53). Contreras complied (R.
202:15, 53). Then, defendant and the rest of the males from the Thunderbird surrounded
Contreras and moved him toward a tree near the front of the house (R. 202:15-16, 53).
There, defendant drew a gun, pointed it at Contreras's head, and pushed him into the tree
(R. 202:15-16). Defendant then put the gun to Contreras's head and took Contreras's
rings, necklace, and wallet. (R. 202: 16-17). One of defendant's friends punched
Contreras in the face, telling him not to squeal or they would "do something to [him]" (R.
202: 16).
Immediately after the robbery, Sandra Cortez came out of her house, told
defendant and his friends to leave, and told Contreras to come inside (R. 202:16).
Defendant and his friends left (R. 202:22).
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Defendant was apprehended three months later during a traffic stop in which he
gave the investigating officer a false name (R. 202:75-76). At the time, defendant was
wearing Contreras's necklace and one of his rings (R. 202:16-20, 75-76).
The Plea Discussion. At a pre-trial conference on December 13, 2002, the
prosecutor and defense counsel presented the trial court with a plea agreement amending
the information to a third degree felony in exchange for a guilty plea (R. 200: 3-4;
Addendum B).
Upon questioning from the court, the prosecutor indicated that "there are some
facts that are—make the story not as presentable to the jury and I would rather accept
the—the lesser plea than run the risk of (inaudible)" (R. 200:4).
In response, the trial court noted that defendant had been originally charged with
aggravated robbery and that the information indicated "that the defendant used a firearm,
which would enhance that, and also that he committed a crime with four other persons,
which would enhance that again" (R. 200:4). The court then indicated its practice not to
waive fire enhancements "unless I'm convinced that there was some mistake in pleading"
(R. 200:4).
When defense counsel offered that "there's also the additional reason . . . in terms
of judicial economy as well" (R. 200:4-5), the trial court responded: "I don't care about
judicial economy when people are alleged to have used firearms in the commission of a
crime" (R. 200:5). Thus, the court continued, "I'm not going to waive the firearms
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enhancement [u]nless you can tell me you don't have any evidence that he didn't [sic]
have a firearm or there wasn't [sic] a firearm or your witness is lying" (R. 200:5).
At that point, the prosecutor explained that the evidence concerning the gun "is the
story that is told by the—by the complaining witness" (R. 200:5). And, although those
facts allege "a serious crime," "sometimes it's better to have the—the verdict in hand
than—than two in the bush" (R. 200:5). The prosecutor continued, "I think this person is
a dangerous person. My objective . . . and my duties to the taxpayers . . . is to take this
person, who I believe to be a dangerous person, and lock him up" (R. 200:5-6). When the
court responded, "Lock him up for zero to five, what kind of a deal is that?" the
prosecutor noted, "It's better than zero to zero, your Honor" (R. 200:6).
After confirming with the prosecutor that the prosecutor had discussed the plea
with his supervisor, the court asked, "What does the victim say about this?" (R. 200:6).
The prosecutor stated, "I have not talked to the victim about this particular one, although
I've talked to the victim previously about offering a second (inaudible)" (R. 200:6).
The court, after noting a supreme court case in which the court "accused the
District Attorney's office and the trial judge of running rampant over victim's rights by
not telling them what's going on," noted, "We haven't even told—we haven't even told
the person who claims all these things occurred as to what are you going to do. I think
he's entitled to know" (R. 200:6-7).
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The court then concluded: "I'm not going to allow the filing of this amended
information at this point and I'm not going to accept any plea to a third-degree felony on
the basis of what I've heard" (R. 200:7).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting his plea
agreement. Specifically, defendant claims that the trial court's rejection of the plea was
erroneous because the court " ( 0 failed to consider all legally relevant factors,
(2) exceeded the limits prescribed by law, and (3) applied its discretion arbitrarily."
This Court generally does not reach claims raised for the first time on appeal
unless defendant can establish plain error. In addition, this Court will not consider a plain
error claim if the record shows that defendant waived the error through invited error, i.e.,
if defendant either strategically chose to forego objecting below or led the trial court into
the error he now claims.
In this case, defendant not only did not raise his claims below when the trial court
originally rejected the plea agreement but also strategically chose not to raise them on the
morning of trial despite an invitation from the trial court to do so. Under such
circumstances, this Court should reject defendant's claims as invited error.
Moreover, each of defendant's challenges rest solely on his contention that "the
trial court. . . summarily rejected the plea because it would not 'waive firearms
enhancements.'" Nowhere does defendant address the other factors upon which the trial
court based its decision, specifically the minimal sentence defendant would receive under
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the plea agreement and the prosecutor's admission that he had not discussed the plea with
the victim. Where the trial court's ruling rests on several grounds and defendant
challenges only one, this Court need not reach his claim. Regardless of this Court's
decision concerning the challenged ground, the other grounds remain to uphold the trial
court's ruling.
Finally, even if this Court reaches defendant's challenges, they fail because
defendant cannot show plain error. A criminal defendant has no constitutional right to a
plea agreement. Moreover, nothing in rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
requires a trial court to accept a plea agreement just because the prosecutor has agreed to
it. Rather, a trial court has discretion to reject a plea agreement where that agreement
appears contrary to the public interest or is otherwise objectionable. Moreover, a
defendant cannot show that he was prejudiced by the rejection of a plea agreement unless
he can show that he relied on the agreement in a way that prejudiced him at his
subsequent trial.
Here, the trial court considered the propriety of accepting a plea to third degree
felony robbery with no enhancements after the defendant had been charged with first
degree felony aggravated robbery because he used a gun, enhanced again because he
committed the crime with two or more other persons. The trial court rejected the plea
agreement because the prosecutor had proffered no evidence to suggest that the original
aggravated robbery charge was unsustainable, because the sentence under the agreement
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was not commensurate with defendant's conduct, and because the prosecutor had not
discussed the agreement with the victim.
Because the trial court's action was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable, defendant
cannot show error, let alone obvious error, in the court's ruling. Moreover, because
defendant cannot show that he relied on the plea agreement to alter his position to his
detriment at trial, defendant cannot show that he was harmed by the trial court's ruling,
even if it were erroneous.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN
REJECTING A PLEA AGREEMENT WHICH REPRESENTED A
SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN THE CHARGE AND, THUS,
DEFENDANT'S POTENTIAL SENTENCE, WHERE THE
PROSECUTOR HAD NOT DISCUSSED THE PLEA WITH THE
VICTIM
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting his plea
agreement with the State because "(A) it failed to consider all legally relevant factors,
(B) it exceeded the scope of its authority, and (C) it applied its discretion arbitrarily."
Aplt. Br. at 9.
This Court should reject defendant's claims as invited error where defendant had
strategic reasons not to revisit the court's plea ruling prior to trial despite having been
invited to do so. Alternatively, this Court should reject defendant's claims because they
are based on only one of the three grounds upon which the trial court based its ruling.
Finally, this Court should reject defendant's claims because he fails to demonstrate plain
error.

A.

This Court should reject defendant's challenges to the trial court's plea
ruling where the court left open the possibility of revisiting its ruling
before trial and, by strategically failing to take advantage of that
possibility, defendant invited the errors of which he now complains.
The general rule in criminal cases is that '"a contemporaneous objection or some

form of specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial court
record before an appellate court will review such claims on appeal.'" State v. Johnson,
114 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah
1987)); see also State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ 11, 10 P.3d 346. The objection at trial
must '"be specific enough to give the trial court notice of the very error . . . complained
of,'" Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co., Inc., 912 P.2d 457, 460 (Utah App. 1996)
(quoting Beehive Medical Elecs., Inc. v. Square D. Co., 699 P.2d 859, 860 (Utah 1983)),
so that the court '"might have an opportunity to correct [it] if [the court] deems it proper"'
Id. (quoting Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Barrutia, 526 P.2d 47, 51 (Utah
1974)) (second bracket in original). This preservation rule "applies to every claim . . .
unless a defendant can demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error'
occurred." Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^f 11.
In this case, the only claim defendant raised below was that the plea was desirable
for reasons of judicial economy (R. 200:4-5). Because defendant did not raise any of his
appellate claims below, this Court can consider them only for plain error. Holgate, 2000
U T 7 4 4 11.
However, even when a party claims plain error, "'if [the] party through counsel
has made a conscious decision to refrain from objecting or has led the trial court into
9

error, [this Court] will then decline to save that party from the error.'" See State v.
Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997) (quoting State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah
1989)).
The reasons for this rule are two-fold. First, the rule "4fortifies our longestablished policy that the trial court should have the first opportunity to address the claim
of error." State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996) (quoting State v. Dunn,
850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993)).
"' Second, it discourages parties from intentionally misleading the trial court so as
to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal.'" Id. (quoting Dunn, 850 P.2d at
1220):
If trial counsel were permitted to forego objecting . . . as part of a
trial strategy that counsel thinks will enhance the defendant's
chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy fails, were permitted to
claim on appeal that the Court should reverse because it was plain
error for the court to [take such an action], [this Court] would be
sanctioning a procedure that fosters invited error.
Bullock, 791 P.2dat 159.
Thus, the plain error doctrine "'is in no way implicated if defense counsel
consciously elects to permit [a certain course of events] as part of a defense strategy
rather than through inadvertence or neglect.'" Brown, 948 P.2d at 343 (quoting Bullock,
791 P.2d at 159). Otherwise, "the trial judge is put in the untenable position of deciding
whether to intervene and potentially interfere with trial counsel's strategy or face review
for plain error." Brown, 948 P.2d at 343.
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In this case, defense counsel and the prosecutor initially presented a plea
agreement at the last pre-trial conference (R. 200:passim). The prosecutor explained that
he favored the agreement because "there are some facts that are—make the story not as
presentable to the jury and I would rather accept the—the lesser plea than run the risk of
(inaudible)" (R. 200:4). Defense counsel's only comment was that the plea was also
advantageous for reasons of "judicial economy" (R. 200:4-5).
The trial court indicated that it was not the court's practice to waive firearm
enhancements "unless I'm convinced that there was some mistake in pleading," i.e.,
"unless you can tell me you don't have any evidence that he [had] a firearm or there [was]
a firearm or your witness is lying" (R. 200:5). The trial court also voiced its
dissatisfaction with a plea that reduced the sentence of what the prosecutor admitted was
a "dangerous man" to zero-to-five years (R. 200:6). Finally, after hearing that the
prosecutor had not discussed the plea with the victim in this case, the trial court indicated,
"I think he's entitled to know" (R. 200:6-7).
The court then ruled: "I'm not going to allow the filing of this amended
information at this point and I'm not going to accept any plea to a third-degree felony on
the basis of what I've heard" (R. 200:7) (emphasis added). The clear implication of the
trial court's ruling is that, while it was rejecting the plea agreement at that time, it would
reconsider its ruling if either party cared to present additional argument at a later time.
Nothing in the record suggests that defendant asked the trial court to revisit its plea
ruling at a later time. Rather, the record indicates that defense counsel made a strategic
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decision not to revisit the trial court's plea ruling before trial on any of the bases he now
raises or on any other basis (R. 201). Instead, after hearing that the State's main
witnesses—the victim Contreras and his friend Rivas—had left the court house on the
morning of trial after being threatened (R. 201:4-5, 9), defense counsel took her chances
and asked for an outright dismissal (R. 201:12-13). Then, when the trial court postponed
ruling on her request to see if the witnesses appeared the next day (R. 201:13), counsel
again yielded the opportunity to revisit the court's plea ruling—apparently taking her
chances again, this time on a dismissal the next day if the witnesses again did not appear,
or on an acquittal based on the weaknesses in the State's case referenced by the
prosecutor during the plea discussions.
Under such circumstances, this Court should reject defendant's plain error claims
challenging the trial court's plea ruling as invited error. See Bullock, 791 P.2d at 159 ("If
trial counsel were permitted to forego objecting . . . as part of a trial strategy that counsel
thinks will enhance the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy fails,
were permitted to [raise the objection on appeal],. . . [this Court] would be sanctioning a
procedure that fosters invited error."); see also Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1109 (holding one
reason for invited error rule is that "it discourages parties from intentionally misleading
the trial court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal.") (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
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B.

This Court should reject defendant's challenges to the trial court's plea
ruling where they focus on only one of the grounds upon which the trial
court relied below.
Defendant challenges the trial court's plea ruling as an abuse of discretion,

claiming the trial court "applied a blanket refusal to consider the plea because [defendant]
was charged with using a firearm" and, thus, "selected] one specific fact at the expense
of all other relevant facts to mechanically reject [defendant's] plea." Aplt. Br. at 22; see
also Aplt. Br. at 11, 16. Because defendant challenges the trial court's ruling on only one
of the grounds relied upon below, this Court need not address defendant's claims.
In State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801, 802 (Utah App. 1998), the defendant was
convicted of rape of a child and sodomy of a child. On appeal, the defendant claimed that
the trial court had abused its discretion in sentencing him to maximum minimum
mandatory sentences on each of his two convictions. See id. at 810. In addressing the
defendant's claim, this Court noted that "defendant challenges only two of the four
aggravating circumstances upon which the trial court based its sentencing determination."
Id. This Court then held that, "because defendant does not challenge the trial court's
findings [on the other two circumstances], we need not address whether the trial court
erred in considering the two disputed bases." Id.; see also State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297,
1301 (Utah 1993) (holding that trial court's reliance on improper aggravating factor is
harmless where additional aggravating factors supported sentence); State v. Russell, 791
P.2d 188, 192 (Utah 1990) (same); State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1988) (same).
Cf. State v. Loose, 2000 UT 11, K 10, 994 P.2d 1237 (rejecting defendant's claim that
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evidence was inadmissible under a statutory provision where evidence was admissible on
another basis); Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249, 256 (Utah 1998) (holding habeas court erred
in reversing convictions based on error in admitting child victim's hearsay statements
under statute where statements were admissible under rules of evidence).
At least one court has applied the same rationale in reviewing a trial court's
rejection of a plea agreement. State v. Southworth, 52 P.3d 987, 997 (N.M. App. 2002)
(holding "we need not determine whether a trial court would abuse its discretion if it
rejected a plea merely because the plea was entered after the expiration of a courtimposed deadline" where "the record shows that the court rejected the plea for a number
of reasons"), cert denied, 52 P.3d 411 (N.M. 2002).
In this case, defendant challenges the trial court's plea ruling as an abuse of
discretion, claiming that the court "refused to . . . consider a plea agreement at all because
it would not 'waive firearms enhancements.'" Aplt. Br. at 16; see also Aplt. Br. at 11, 22.
Nowhere does defendant acknowledge, let alone show error in, the trial court's
alternative grounds for rejecting the plea agreement—that the minimal sentence was not
commensurate to the charged crime or defendant's dangerousness and that prosecutor had
not informed the victim of the plea agreement. Cf. State v. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13,
U 15, 17 P.3d 1153 (indicating that trial court could properly reject plea agreement that
"failed to adequately address the issue of restitution"); State v. Hines, 919 S.W.2d 573,
578 (Tenn. 1995) (noting "a valid reason for rejecting a plea agreement is that the
proposed sentence is considered too lenient under the circumstances"); Southworth, 52
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P.3d at 997 (same); United States v. Jeter, 315 F.3d 445, 447 (5th Cir. 2002) (same);
United States v. Torres -Echavarria, 129 F.3d 692, 696 (2nd Cir. 1997) (same); United
States v. Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423, 1439 (10,h Cir. 1995) (same); United States v.
Carrigan, 778 F.2d 1454, 1462 (10th Cir. 1985) (same, even where prosecutor voiced
concern over difficulty of proving charged crimes and parties raised issue of judicial
economy); United States v. Miller, 722 F.2d 562, 563 (9th Cir. 1983) (same); United
States v. Bean, 564 F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 1977) (same); see also People v. Grove, 566
N.W.2d 547, 588 (Mich. 1997) (holding trial court properly considered interests of victim
in rejecting plea); cf. State v. Casey, 2002 UT 29,1fi[ 26, 37 & n.l 1, 44 P.3d 756 (holding
victim's "constitutional and statutory right to be heard upon request... include[s] the
right to be heard upon request at defendant's change of plea hearing"; noting that,
although not required before accepting or rejecting a plea agreement, informing a victim
of the agreement is "sound judicial practice"); Utah Const, art. I, § 28; Utah Code Ann.
§§ 77-37-3, 77-38-3, 77-38-4 (1999 & Supp.2003).
Under such circumstances, this Court "need not address whether the trial court
erred in considering the . .. disputed bas[is]." Baker, 963 P.2d at 810; see also Strunk,
846 P.2d at 1301; Russell, 791 P.2d at 192; Lovell, 758 P.2d at 913; Southworth, 52 P.3d
at 99; cf. Loose, 2000 UT 11, U 11; Julian, 966 P.2d at 256.
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C.

This Court should reject defendant's challenges to the trial court's plea
ruling where he cannot show the court committed plain error in
rejecting an agreement which represented a significant reduction in the
charge and, thus, defendant's potential sentence, and the prosecutor
had not discussed the plea with the victim.
Defendant claims that the trial court committed plain error in rejecting defendant's

plea "by failing to consider all legally relevant factors, exceeding the scope of its
authority and applying its discretion arbitrarily when it rejected [defendant's] plea
agreement." Aplt. Br. at 8-9, 26. Defendant claims the error should have been obvious to
the trial court because its decision to reject the plea agreement was "based not on the
proper exercise of its judicial discretion but on the arbitrary exercise of its personal bias
toward defendants who are charged with using a firearm." Aplt. Br. at 26; see also Aplt.
Br. at 11, 16, 22. Finally, defendant claims he was prejudiced by the trial court's decision
because, "[i]f the trial court had considered the legally relevant factors of Montiel's case
and deferred to the State's prosecutorial discretion, rather than summarily rejecting the
plea because Montiel was charged with using a firearm, there is a substantial likelihood
that the trial court would have accepted the plea agreement." Aplt. Br. at 26-27; see also
Aplt. Br. at 24.
Because defendant did not raise his claims below, they succeed only if defendant
can show plain error. To establish plain error, defendant must show that (1) the trial court
erred; (2) the error should have been obvious; and (3) the error was prejudicial. See State
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993).
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Moreover, where defendant presents a plain error challenge to a trial court's ruling
generally reviewed for abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion defendant must show
"must be much more blatant than the garden variety 'abuse of discretion' featured in
routine appellate review." State v. Stirba, 872 P.2d 918, 923 (Utah App. 1998 (discussing
standard of review where State challenged ruling for abuse of discretion under Utah R.
Civ. P. 65B) (citation omitted)). Under such circumstances, defendant must show a
"'gross and flagrant' abuse of discretion." Id. (quoting Renn v. Utah State Bd. of
Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 683 (Utah 1995)).
Finally, "[t]o show obviousness of the error, [defendant] must show that the law
was clear at the time of trial." State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, K 6, 18 P.3d 1123; see
also State v. Frausto, 2002 UT App 259, f 22, 53 P.3d 486, cert, denied, 63 P.3d 104
(Utah 2002); State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah App. 1997).
Here, defendant cannot show error, let alone obvious and prejudicial error.
1.

General law regarding plea agreements.

"Plea bargaining is an essential component of the criminal justice system." State v.
Pearson, 818 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah App. 1991) (discussing admission of evidence of plea
negotiations). Not only does such bargaining "lead[] to the prompt and . . . final
disposition of most criminal cases," Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971),
but it may also "affordf] the prosecutor additional leverage in prosecuting other crimes,
and allows defendants who acknowledge guilt to spare themselves and the public an
expensive trial," State v. Eager, 630 N.W.2d 828, 833 (Iowa 2001). Consequently,
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'"[pjroperly administered, [plea bargaining] is to be encouraged.'" Pearson, 818 P.2d at
582 (quoting Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260) (second alternation in original) (emphasis
added).
However, "[a] criminal defendant does not have an absolute right under the
Constitution to have his guilty plea accepted by the court." North Carolina v. Alford, 400
U.S. 25, 38 n.l 1 (1970); see also Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262; Lynch v. Overholser, 369
U.S. 705, 719 (1962). Indeed, "[a] plea bargain, standing alone, is without constitutional
significance; in itself it is a mere executory agreement which, until embodied in the
judgment of a court, does not deprive an accused of liberty or any other constitutionally
protected interest." Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507 (1984); see also State v.
Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, K 14, 17 P.3d 1153.
Moreover, a criminal defendant has no right to a plea bargain under Utah law.
Rather, "[t]he Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly provide that '[t]he court may
refuse to accept a plea of guilty.'" State v. Turner, 980 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Utah App.
1995) (quoting Utah R. Crim. P. 11); see also State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61, 66 (Utah App.
1989) ("Nothing in [rule 11] requires a court to accept a guilty plea.").

"[E]ven where

'the government and the defendant reach a plea agreement, the court is not required to
accept it.'" State v. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, K 14, 17 P.3d 1153 (citation omitted);
Consequently, even though "disposition of criminal charges by agreement between
the prosecutor and the accused . . . is an essential component of the administration of
justice," "[a] court may reject a plea in exercise of sound judicial discretion." Santobello,
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404 U.S. at 260, 262; see also Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, % 14; Turner, 980 P.2d at
1190; United States v. Torres -Echavarria, 129 F.3d 692, 695 (2nd Cir. 1997); United
States v. Severino, 800 F.2d 42, 45 (2nd Cir. 1986).
2.

Defendant fails to demonstrate that the trial court erred, let alone
obviously erred, in failing to consider "all relevant factors" before
rejecting the plea agreement.

Defendant claims that "[a] trial court has a duty, before rejecting a plea agreement,
to 'consider all legally relevant factors.'" Aplt. Br. at 9-14 (quoting Turner, 980 P.2d at
1190). Defendant claims first that the trial court did not do this because it "fail[ed] to
evaluate the circumstances of Montiel's case." Aplt Br. at 9 (holding and capitalization
omitted). He claims second that the trial court did not do this because it rejected the plea
agreement "without determining the propriety of the particular bargain proposed." Aplt.
Br. at 12.
In support of his contentions, defendant cites two Utah cases addressing plea
agreements and one Utah rule of procedure. See Aplt. Br. at 8-26 (citing State v. Turner,
980 P.2d 1188 (Utah App. 1998); State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61 (Utah App. 1989); Utah R.
Crim. P. 11). None of this authority supports his contentions.
In Mane, the defendant was charged with murder in the first degree, attempted
murder, and two counts of aggravated assault. Mane, 783 P.2d at 62. After the State's
case-in-chief, Mane "offered to plead guilty to [one] aggravated assault charge." Id. at
66. The trial court rejected Mane's plea, "stating the defendant could plead guilty only
after he presented his defense to the jury but prior to the verdict." Id. When Mane
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renewed his motion at the close of his case-in-chief, the trial court rejected the plea
"because defendant had just testified that he had no memory of any of his actions." Id.
When Mane "then offered to plead guilty to the attempted homicide charge," the trial
court rejected that plea for the same reason. Id.
In affirming the trial court's rulings, this Court's entire analysis consisted of the
following paragraph:
Defendant incorrectly insists the court was obligated to accept
his guilty plea. Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that "[t]he court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or no
contest." Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-11(e) (Supp. 1988) (repeated
effective July 1, 1990). Nothing in the statute requires a court to
accept a guilty plea and defendant has cited no case authority for that
proposition. We conclude, therefore, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by refusing to accept defendant's guilty plea.
Id.
In Turner, the defendant was charged with negligent homicide and driving left of
center after his truck crossed over the center dividing line into oncoming traffic and hit a
motorcycle, causing the motorcyclist's death. Turner, 980 P.2d at 1189. At the
arraignment, defendant pleaded guilty to the driving left of center charge and not guilty to
the negligent homicide charge, and then requested immediate sentencing on his plea. Id.
The State, concerned that Turner "was trying to create a 'double jeopardy' problem which
would prohibit the State from prosecuting [him] on the negligent homicide charge," asked
the court to reject Turner's guilty plea or "reserve its ruling . . . until after trial on both
charges." Id. After the trial court expressed "reservations about its decision to accept the
plea,. . . defense counsel persuaded the court that it was obliged to accept the plea, and
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the court acceded." Id. A different court then granted Turner's motion to dismiss the
negligent homicide charge. Id.
On appeal, this Court reversed the trial court's acceptance of Turner's guilty plea.
Turner, 980 P.2d at 1190. In doing so, this Court reiterated:
Contrary to defendant's assertion below, that the trial court was
obligated to accept his guilty plea, defendant had no absolute right to
have his plea of guilt accepted. See Lynch v. Overhoteer, 369 U.S.
705, 719, 82 S. Ct. 1063, 1072, 8 L.Ed.2d211 (1962). The Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly provide that "[t]he trial court
may refuse to accept a plea of guilty." Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e); see
also Lynch, 369 U.S. at 719, 82 S. Ct. at 1072 (stating under Rule 11
of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure "trial judge may refuse to
accept [guilty] plea and enter a plea of not guilty on behalf of the
accused"). In addition, this court has previously held that "[n]othing
in [Rule 11(e) requires a court to accept a guilty plea." Mane, 783
P.2d at 66.
Id.
The Court continued: "Because it is unclear whether the trial court erroneously
assumed it was obliged to accept the plea rather than realizing it had the discretion to
accept or reject the plea, we must determine whether the trial court's acceptance of
defendant's plea was an abuse of that discretion." Id.
Then, with no analysis as to which was appropriate for determining abuse of
discretion in the specific area of plea bargains, this Court set forth the traditional tests
used to determine abuse of discretion, noting that discretion is abused "if the actions of
the judge are inherently unfair," "if its decision is beyond the limits of reasonableness," or
if "the judge fails to consider all legally relevant factors." Id. (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
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Without further explanation, this Court applied only the first and second tests in
concluding that "under the circumstances of this case, acceptance of the plea over the
timely and specific objections of the State was unfair and unreasonable, effectively
nullifying the State's right to prosecute defendant on the charge of negligent homicide."
Id. (emphasis added).
Neither Mane nor Turner support defendant's claim that the trial court committed
error, let alone obvious error, in rejecting defendant's plea agreement here. Mane upheld
the trial court's initial rejection of the defendant's plea even though the lower court
apparently gave no reasons for its decision, and then upheld the court's subsequent
rejection of his plea on the sole basis that the defendant had feigned no memory of his
criminal conduct. See Mane, 783 P.2d at 66. Turner did not even involve review of the
rejection of a plea, and merely identified the prosecutor's interest in prosecuting on a
greater crime and society's "'interest in the vindication of criminal justice" as relevant
factors in determining whether to accept a plea. See Turner, 980 P.2d at 1190 (citation
omitted). Thus, neither case provides significant guidance to trial courts as to what
factors, if any, it must consider before rejecting a plea.
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, similarly provides little guidance
concerning the trial court's discretion to reject pleas. Although defendant cites to Rule
11(e) as identifying some of the factors a trial court must consider before rejecting a plea,
see Aplt. Br. at 10, 13, Rule 11(e) in fact identifies no such factors. Rather, rule 11(e)
merely identifies those findings a trial court must make before it may accept a plea. See
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Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e) ("The court.. . may not accept the plea until the court has found
. . . .")• Otherwise, the rule merely provides that "[t]he court may refuse to accept a plea
of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill." Id.
Because neither Mane, Turner, nor Rule 11(e) identify any mandatory factors a
trial court must consider before rejecting a plea, none of them support defendant's plain
error claim that the trial court abused its discretion by not considering all legally relevant
factors before rejecting his plea. See State v. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, ^ 15, 17 P.3d
1153 (suggesting that a trial court may properly reject plea agreement that "failed to
adequately address the issue of restitution"); see also Frausto, 2002 UT App 259, f 22;
Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, % 6; Ross, 951 P.2d at 239.
As a consequence, defendant relies primarily on selected case law from foreign
jurisdictions—none of which are controlling in Utah—to identify such factors. See Aplt.
Br. at 8 n.2 (explaining that "[t]he limits of a trial court's discretion to reject guilty pleas
are not yet clearly defined by Utah case law," and thus that defendant's brief "relies
largely on case law from other jurisdictions); see also Aplt. Br. At 9-13 (citing cases).
However, defendant cannot demonstrate complete uniformity amongst those cases.
See, e.g., Hockada v. United States, 359 A.2d 146, 148 & n.4 (D.C. App. 1976) (holding
only that trial court's ruling must show that "its action was the result of an informed and
reasoned exercise of discretion" and "where, as here, a disposition has been agreed upon
by both the defendant and the government, the trial court must identify good reasons for a
departure from following that course"); Daniels v. State, 453 N.E.2d 160, 165 (Ind. 1983)
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(not providing list of mandatory factors court must consider, but merely noting that trial
court considered evidence of crime, defendant's presentence report, feelings of victim's
family, time spent by parties in arranging plea, and respect due criminal statutes); Stacks
v. State, 111 RE.2d 1201, 1207 (Ind. App. 1978) (holding trial court "'bears an
obligation to evaluate the circumstances of the case and determine the propriety of the
particular bargain,'" but failing to provide any further guidance to trial courts concerning
factors it should consider); State v. Eager, 630 N.W.2d 828, 836 (Iowa 2001) (holding
that trial court may not reject plea solely because of missed deadline; requiring trial court
to provide additional reasons but noting u[t]hese additional reasons are broad and fall
within the ambit of the court's power over the administration of justice" and "may relate
to the terms of the plea agreement [or] the proper disposition of the case"); State v.
Clanton, 612 P.2d 662, 665-66 (Kan. App. 1980) (not providing list of mandatory factors
court must consider, but merely holding that decision to accept or reject plea after
statutory requirements met is within sound judicial discretion of court and "will not be
disturbed on appeal unless it is determined that no reasonable person could take the view
adopted by the trial judge" ); Sparks v. State, 759 P.2d 180, 184-85 (Nev. 1988) (per
curiam) (holding trial court must "consider seriously the proffered plea" but providing
only the most general outline of factors court can consider in rejecting plea); State v.
Hines, 919 S.W.2d 573, 577-78 (Tenn. 1995) (not providing list of mandatory factors
court must consider, but merely noting what trial court considered, including victim's
position and leniency of sentence under plea); State v. Reuschel, 312 A.2d 739, 743 (Vt.
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1973) (not providing list of mandatory factors court must consider, but merely noting that
trial court considered, including defendant's vacillating statements regarding his guilt and
evidence State would produce); State v. Sears, 542 S.E.2d 863, 867 (W.Va. 2000) (setting
forth specific factors court should consider before rejecting plea, including whether plea
was voluntary, whether plea had factual basis, the "general public's perception that
crimes should be prosecuted," the "interests of victims," the "entire criminal event,"
"defendant's prior criminal record," and whether the plea bargain allows the court "to
dispose of the case in a manner commensurate with the seriousness of the criminal
charges and the character and background of the defendant").
Moreover, defendant cannot demonstrate that any list of factors identified in those
cases actually enjoys universal acceptance. See, e.g., United States v. Torres-Echavarria,
129 F.3d 692, 696 (2nd. Cir. 1997) (holding only that "[ajmong the reasons that may
justify the exercise of discretion to reject a plea agreement is a concern that the resulting
sentence would be too lenient"); United States v. Miller, 722 F.2d 562, 563, 566 (9th Cir.
1993) (holding only that, although trial court may reject bargain as "too lenient, or
otherwise not in the public interest," court's decision must also show that it considered
prosecutor's reasons for presenting plea offer); United States v. Severino, 800 F.2d 42,
45-46 (2nd Cir. 1986) (noting "Rule 11 does not purport to establish criteria for the
acceptance or rejection of a plea agreement" and holding only that "if the court has
reasonable grounds for beliving that acceptance of the plea would be contrary to the
sound administration of justice, it may reject the plea"); United States v. Carrigan, 778
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F.2d 1454, 1461-62 (10th Cir. 1985) (noting "plea agreement procedure does not attempt
to define criteria for the acceptance or rejection of a plea agreement" and that plea may be
rejected if "the district court believes that the bargain is too lenient or otherwise not in the
public interest") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Moore,
637 F.2d 1194, 1196 (8th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (holding "Rule 11 does not require
district courts to either accept a guilty plea or delineate its reasons for rejecting it"); State
v. Bean, 564 F.2d 700, 702 n.2 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that, where Rule 11 provides
"specific procedural requirements for entering gulty pleas, we find that the absence of any
requirement that the court state its reasons for refusing a plea bargain indicates that no
statement of reasons is necessary"); State v. Jasper, 17 P.3d 807, 814-16 (Colo. 2001) (en
banc) (affirming trial court's rejection of plea agreement, without considering merits,
based solely on fact that plea was presented after deadline where parties presented no
good cause for missing deadline); People v. Grove, 566 N.W.2d 547, 558 (Mich. 1997)
(affirming trial court's rejection of plea where trial court considered facts of crime,
interest of victim, and hindrance on court's ability to impose appropriate sentence).
Here, the trial court considered each of the following factors before rejecting the
proposed plea agreement:
(1)

the prosecutor's concerns regarding the strength of his
evidence as a factor in favor of accepting the plea (R. 200:4,
5);

(2)

the prosecutor's failure to persuade the court that "there was
some mistake in pleading" aggravated robbery (robbery
enhanced to a first degree felony because defendant used a
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firearm), where trial court generally does not waive firearm
enhancements (R. 200:4, 5);
(3)

defense counsel's reference to judicial economy as a factor in
favor of accepting the plea (R. 200:4-5);

(4)

the seriousness of defendant's crime (R. 200:5);

(5)

the lack of congruity between the prosecutor's claim that
defendant "is a dangerous person" should be "lock[ed] up"
and the prosecutor's willingness to have defendant plead to a
crime that exposed defendant to a maximum sentence of zeroto-five years (R. 200:5-6); and

(6)

the fact that the agreement reduced a first degree felony
(robbery enhanced to aggravated robbery because defendant
used a firearm) to a third degree felony (R. 200:4); and

(7)

the prosecutor's admission that he had not discussed this
particular plea with the victim, even though the court felt the
victim had a right to know (R. 200:6-7).

Thus, contrary to defendant's claim, the trial court "did . . . consider . . . evidence
of the charged crime." Aplt. Br. at 11. Also contrary to defendant's claim, the trial court
did "consider the victim's actual desires." Aplt. Br. at 11. And, contrary to defendant's
claim, the trial court did consider "whether the plea was appropriate in light of the entire
charged crime" and "whether the State's reasons for entering the plea agreement were
appropriate in light of public interest." Aplt. Br. at 13.
In light of this myriad of cases cited above, defendant cannot show that the trial
court erred, let alone obviously erred, in failing to consider additional factors before
rejecting the plea agreement in this case. Cf. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, ^ 15
(suggesting trial court could properly reject plea agreement that "failed to adequately
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address the issue of restitution"); Hines, 919 S.W.2d at 578 (holding "a valid reason for
rejecting a plea agreement is that the proposed sentence is considered too lenient under
the circumstances"); see also State v. Southworth, 52 P.3d 987, 997 (N.M. App. 2002)
(same), cert, denied, 52 P.3d 411 (N.M. 2002); United States v. Jeter, 315 F.3d 445, 447
(5th Cir. 2002) (same); United States v. Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423, 1439 (10th Cir. 1995)
(same); Torres-Echavarria, 129 F.3d at 696 (same); Carrigan, 778 F.2d at 1462 (same,
even where prosecutor voiced concern over difficulty of proving charged crimes and
parties raised issue of judicial economy); Miller, 111 F.2d at 563 (same); Bean, 564 F.2d
at 704 (same); and see also Southworth, 52 P.3d at 996 (affirming rejection of plea even
though "State's offer was made in light of evidence obtained . . . suggesting credibility
problems on both sides"); and see also Grove, 566 N.W.2d at 588 (holding trial court
properly considered interests of victim in rejecting plea); cf. State v. Casey, 2002 UT 29,
ffl[ 26, 37 & n.l 1, 44 P.3d 756 (holding victim's "constitutional and statutory right to be
heard upon request at important criminal justice hearings include[s] the right to be heard
upon request at defendant's change of plea hearing"; noting that, although required before
accepting or rejecting a plea agreement, informing a victim of the agreement is "sound
judicial practice"); Utah Const, art. I, § 28; Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-37-3, 77-38-3, 77-38-4
(1999&Supp.2003).
Consequently, defendant's plain error claim fails.
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3.

Defendant's claim that the trial court committed plain error by
exceeding the scope of its authority in rejecting the plea
agreement fails where he presents no controlling law on the
issue.

Alternatively, defendant claims that the trial court "abused its discretion [in
rejecting the plea agreement] by exceeding the scope of its authority." Aplt. Br. at 14
(holding and capitalization omitted). Specifically, defendant claims that the trial court
"exceeded the scope of its authority by usurping the State's right to prosecute" and thus
"infringing on the separation of powers." Aplt. Br. at 14-15 (holding and capitalization
omitted). Defendant has not established plain error.
As with his previous claim, defendant cites to very little controlling Utah law to
support his claim. See Aplt. Br. at 14-21 (citing only to State v. Turner, 980 P.2d 1188,
1190 (Utah App. 1995), and Utah Const. Art. V, § 1 (the separation of powers
provision)).1
Although Turner recognized that a trial court should consider the prosecutor's
interest in prosecuting a defendant on the original charges filed when it considers a plea
to a lesser offense over the prosecutor's objection, see Turner, 980 P.2d at 1190, Turner
never expressly addressed the separation of powers provision of the Utah Constitution or

'Article V, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution provides:
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be
divided into three distinct departments, the Legislature, the
Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with the
exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these
departments shall exercise any functions appertaining to
either of the others.
Utah Const. Art. V., § 1.
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the extent to which that provision limits a trial court's discretion to reject plea bargains
favored by the prosecutor.
Thus, neither defendant's citation to Turner nor his citation without analysis to the
separation of powers provision of the Utah Constitution establish that the trial court
committed plain error in rejecting the plea agreement here. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d
1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993) (holding defendant must establish obvious and prejudicial
error to succeed on plain error claim); see also State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, ^ 6, 18
P.3d 1123 ("To show obviousness of the error, [defendant] must show that the law was
clear at the time of trial."); State v. Frausto, 2002 UT App 259, \ 22, 53 P.3d 486, cert
denied, 63 P.3d 104 (Utah 2002); State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah App. 1997).
Neither does the case law from foreign jurisdictions cited by defendant.
As a general rule, "[t]he decision to indict, allege specific charges, or dismiss
charges is inherently an exercise of executive power, and the prosecutor has broad
discretion in these matters." United States v. Martin, 287 F.3d 609, 623 (7th Cir. 2002);
see also United States v. Arenas-Ortiz, 339 F.3d 1066, 1068 (9th Cir. 2003); United States
v. Smith, 231 F.3d 800, 807 (11th Cir. 2000), cert, denied, 532 U.S. 1019 (2001). To that
extent, the cases cited by the State are consistent with the cases cited by defendant. See
Aplt. Br. at 14-15 (citing cases explaining why prosecutors are in better position than
courts to determine what charges to file).
However, the cases cited by defendant and the State diverge sharply on the roles of
prosecutor and judge once initial charges have been filed. Defendant's cases suggest that,
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even after initial charges are filed, the prosecutor's "decision to enter a plea agreement 'is
to be followed in the overwhelming number of cases,'" and that, especially in plea cases
involving changes to the original charges, "the trial court 'does not have primary
responsibility [of determining the appropriate plea], but rather the [secondary] role of
guarding against abuses of prosecutorial discretion.'" Aplt. Br. at 15, 17 (quoting United
States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1973), and Hockaday v. United States,
359 A.2d 146, 148 (D.C. App. 1976); citing Sandy v. Fifth Judicial District Court, 935
P.2dll48, 1151 (Nev. 1997)).
Numerous jurisdictions reject that view. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, for
example, has expressly rejecting the approach adopted in Ammidown, "find[ing]
unacceptable the District of Columbia standard that a court must accept a plea unless the
bargain is 'such a departure from sound prosecutorial principle as to mark an abuse of
prosecutorial discretion'" and noting that "[t]o our knowledge no other circuit has
followed the District of Columbia in so drastically limiting the discretion of a judge in
regard to plea bargains." United States v. Bean, 564 F.2d 700, 703 n.4 (5th Cir. 1977); see
also United States v. Moore, 637 F.2d 1194, 1196 (8th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) ('The
precedential value of Ammidown has been considerably diminished since the adoption of
the 1974 amendments to Rule 11 that were intended to increase the discretionary
authority of the district court in dealing with guilty pleas."); State v. Daniels, 648 A.2d
266, 268 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (rejecting idea in Ammidown that plea agreement
can only be rejected if it "'constitutes an abuse of prosecutorial discretion'"; noting
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Ammidown has been superseded by amendment to Rule 11 "and by subsequent federal
cases which enhance the discretionary authority of the district courts in dealing with
guilty pleas.") (citation omitted).2
Under these cases, once the prosecutor decides what charges to file, "the court has
a role to play in plea bargains." Martin, 287 F.3d at 623. Thus, once charges are filed,
"[t]he [government's authority in choosing what offenses a defendant will face is
tempered by the role of the district court in accepting or rejecting plea agreements."
United States v. Jeter, 315 F.3d 445, 447 (5th Cir. 2002).
Under these cases, the same separation of powers concerns raised at the charging
stage are not so prevalent at the plea stage. See Bean, 564 F.2d at 703 n.4 ("Although a
prosecutor may have wide discretion in initiating prosecutions, once the aid of the court
has been invoked the court cannot be expected to accept without question the prosecutor's
view of the public good."); cf. United States v. Carrigan, 778 F.2d 1454, 1465 (10th Cir.
1985) (holding order denying plea bargain under Rule 1 he) "does not present the same
constitutional difficulties as one denying" the State's motion to totally dismiss charges).
In fact, "[p]lea bargains . . . go to the traditionally judicial function of determining
what penalty to impose." United States v. Escobar Noble, 653 F.2d 34, 37 (1st Cir. 1981).
Therefore, especially "where the plea agreement involves essentially the dismissal of the

Although Sandy v. Fifth Judicial District Court, 935 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Nev.
1997), a case cited by defendant, does not expressly rely on Ammidown, Sandy relies on
Sparks v. State, 759 P.2d 180 (Nev. 1988) (per curiam), which does expressly rely on
Ammidown. See Sparks, 759 P.2d at 184-85. Thus, the Nevada cases are subject to the
same criticism directed at Ammidown.
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sole count in the original charge and a plea of guilty to a lesser offense," such agreement
"implicates core judicial functions,"—and thus separation of powers concerns of
prosecutorial infringement—and the "court's adjudicatory and sentencing responsibilities
justify active scrutiny of the plea agreement." United States v. Torres-Echavarria, 129
F.3d 692, 697 (2nd Cir. 1997); see also Miller, 111 F.2d at 563 (noting that discretion to
reject pleas "protects against erosion of the judicial sentencing power").
Consequently, while some courts have stated that trial courts should "hesita[te]
before second-guessing prosecutorial choices" concerning a plea bargain, United States v.
Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423, 1438 (10th Cir. 1995) (a case cited by defendant); see also
Miller, 111 F.2d at 565, and consider the prosecutor's reasons for presenting the bargain,
see Escobar Noble, 653 F.2d at 36, the trial court violates no separation of powers
principles in exercising its discretion to reject the bargain if the court believes the
defendant would receive too light a sentence under it. See Robertson, 45 F.3d at 1439;
Miller, 111 F.2d at 563; see also United States v. Jeter, 315 F.3d 445, 447 (5th Cir. 2002)
(rejecting defendant's claim that the trial court "abused its discretion when it rejected the
initial plea agreement by usurping the Government's exclusive authority to determine
when a prosecution should be terminated"); Martin, 287 F.3d at 624. Cf. Escobar Noble,
653F.2dat37.
In this case, the plea bargain involved the reduction of a original first degree
felony charge (with an enhancement) to a third degree felony charge (R. 200:passim).
Thus, the agreement went "to the traditionally judicial function of determining what
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penalty to impose," Escobar Noble, 653 F.2d at 37, and "implicate[d] core judicial
functions," Torres-Echavarria, 129 F.3d at 697.
Under such circumstances, the "court's adjudicatory and sentencing
responsibilities justified] active scrutiny of the plea agreement," Torres-Echavarria, 129
F.3d at 697, and rejection of that agreement if the court concluded "the bargain [was] too
lenient, or otherwise not in the public interest.'" Carrigan, 778 F.2d at 1462 (quoting
Miller, 722 F.2d at 563). Based on this case law, defendant has not shown that the trial
court committed plain error in violation of the separation of powers provision of the Utah
constitution in rejecting the plea on those bases.
4.

Defendant's claim that the trial court committed plain error by
arbitrarily rejecting the plea agreement fails where the record
does not support it

Finally, defendant claims that the trial court "abused its discretion by arbitrarily
rejecting Montiel's plea agreement" by "applying] a blanket refusal to consider the plea
because Montiel was charged with using a firearm." Aplt. Br. at 22. Defendant claims
that, "[b]y selecting one specific fact at the expense of all other relevant facts to
mechanically reject Montiel's plea, the trial court acted arbitrarily and abused its
discretion." Apl1. Br. at 22-23. This Court should reject defendant's claim as
unsupported by the record.
As previously noted, the trial court considered all of the following factors before
rejecting the plea agreement:
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(1)

the prosecutor's concerns regarding the strength of his
evidence as a factor in favor of accepting the plea (R. 200:4,
5);

(2)

the prosecutor's failure to persuade the court that "there was
some mistake in pleading" aggravated robbery (robbery
enhanced to a first degree felony because defendant used a
firearm), where trial court generally does not waive firearm
enhancements (R. 200:4, 5);

(3)

defense counsel's reference to judicial economy as a factor in
favor of accepting the plea (R. 200:4-5);

(4)

the seriousness of defendant's crime (R. 200:5);

(5)

the lack of congruity between the prosecutor's claim that
defendant "is a dangerous person" should be "lockfed] up"
and the prosecutor's willingness to have defendant plead to a
crime that exposed defendant to a maximum sentence of zeroto-five years (R. 200:5-6); and

(6)

the fact that the agreement reduced a first degree felony
(robbery enhanced to aggravated robbery because defendant
used a firearm) to a third degree felony (R. 200:4); and

(7)

the prosecutor's admission that he had not discussed this
particular plea with the victim, even though the court felt the
victim had a right to know (R. 200:6-7).

Thus, contrary to defendant's claim, the trial court did not "arbitrarily" reject the
plea agreement "based solely on its personal policy to never waive firearms
enhancements." Aplt. Br. at 23.3
3

In fact, the court's policy was not to "never waive firearms enhancements," Aplt.
Br. at 23, but, rather, to waive them only if the prosecutor proffered that the enhancement
was improperly charged or that the evidence was insufficient to support it (R. 200:5).
Such a policy is not obviously erroneous. See, e.g., Daniels v. State, 453 N.E.2d 160, 165
(Ind. 1983) (holding trial court did not abuse discretion in rejecting plea to original charge
that removed consideration of death penalty despite victim's support for plea and "great
deal of time" spent in arranging plea, where trial court "was concerned with affording the
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5.

Defendant's plain error claims fail because he cannot show he
was prejudiced by the court's rejection of the plea agreement.

Defendant claims that he was prejudiced by the trial court's rejection of his plea
"because, 4[b]y proceeding to trial,' the defendant [was] 'exposed to a greater possible
punishment than that which could have resulted from his guilty pleas." Aplt. Br. at 24
(quoting Hockaday v. United States, 359 A.2d 146, 149 (D.C. App. 1976)). Alternatively,
defendant claims he was prejudiced by the trial court's ruling because, "[i]f the trial court
had considered the legally relevant factors of Montiel's case and deferred to the State's
prosecutorial discretion, rather than summarily rejecting the plea because Montiel was
charged with using a firearm, there is a substantial likelihood that the trial court would
have accepted the plea agreement." Aplt. Br. at 26-27. Defendant's claim fails because
he has used the wrong standard to measure prejudice under these circumstances.
In the context of a rejected plea agreement, a defendant is prejudiced by a trial
court's abuse of discretion only if he can show that he "took any action in reliance on the
tentative agreement" that "would substantially affect" his trial. State v. Stringham, 2001
UT App 13, ^ 15-16, 17 P.3d 1153 (indicating that trial court could properly reject plea
agreement that "failed to adequately address the issue of restitution.").
In this case, defendant does not claim that he took any action in reliance on his
tentative plea agreement with the prosecutor, let alone that such action substantially

proper credibility and respect to the death penalty statute as a law which had been passed
by the General Assembly on behalf of all the citizens of the state.").
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affected his trial. Thus, even assuming arguendo that the trial court erred in rejecting the
plea agreement, defendant cannot show that he was prejudiced by the trial court's error.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's conviction
and sentence.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 2 j _ November 2003.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

KAREN A. KLUCZNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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Rule 11. Pleas.
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be
represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a
reasonable time to confer with counsel.
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason
of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative
not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or
if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not
guilty
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court.
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be
set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an
early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial.
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found:
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived;
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense
to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that
the plea is an admission of all those elements;
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant
or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction;
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that
may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached;
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion
to withdraw the plea; and
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record
or, if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has
established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the
contents of the statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English
language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to
the defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea.
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to
make a motion under Section 77-13-6.

(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included
offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved by
the court.
(g)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court
shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence
is not binding on the court.
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney.
(h)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement
and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge
may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the
proposed disposition will be approved.
(h)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in
conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and
then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea.
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea.
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to
the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance
with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103.
(Amended effective May 1, 1993; January 1, 1996; November 1, 1997; November 1, 2001; November 1, 2002.)

ARTICLE I
DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS
Sec. 28. [Declaration of the rights of crime victims.]
(1) To preserve and protect victims* rights to justice and due process, victims
of crimes have these rights, as defined by law:
(a) To be treated with fairness, respect, and dignity, and to be free from
harassment and abuse throughout the criminal justice process;
(b) Upon request, to be informed of, be present at, and to be heard at
important criminal justice hearings related to the victim, either in person
or through a lawful representative, once a criminal information or
indictment charging a crime has been publicly filed in court; and
(c) To have a sentencing judge, for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence, receive and consider, without evidentiary limitation,
reliable information concerning the background, character, and conduct of
a person convicted of an offense except that this subsection does not apply
to capital cases or situations involving privileges.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed as creating a cause of action
for money damages, costs, or attorney's fees, or for dismissing any criminal
charge, or relief from any criminal judgment.
(3) The provisions of this section shall extend to all felony crimes and such
other crimes or acts, including juvenile offenses, as the Legislature may
provide.
(4) The Legislature shall have the power to enforce and define this section
by statute.

CHAPTER 37
\^CTIMS' RIGHTS
77-37-3. Bill of Rights.
(1) The bill of rights for victims and witnesses is:
(a) Victims and witnesses have a right to be informed as to the level of
protection from intimidation and harm available to them, and from what
sources, as they participate in criminal justice proceedings as designated
by Section 76-8-508, regarding witness tampering, and Section 76-8-509,
regarding threats against a victim. Law enforcement, prosecution, and
corrections personnel have the duty to timely provide this information in
a form that is useful to the victim.
lb) Victims and witnesses, including children and their guardians, have
a right to be informed and assisted as to their role in the criminal justice
process. All criminal justice agencies have the duty to provide this
information and assistance.
(c) Victims and witnesses have a right to clear explanations regarding
relevant legal proceedings; these explanations shall be appropriate to the
age of child victims and witnesses. All criminal justice agencies have the
duty to provide these explanations.
(d) Victims and witnesses should have a secure waiting area that does
not require them to be in close proximity to defendants or the family and
friends of defendants. Agencies controlling facilities shall, whenever
possible, provide this area.
(e) Victims are entitled to restitution or reparations, including medical
costs, as provided in Title 63, Chapter 25a, Criminal Justice and Substance Abuse, and Sections 62A-7-122, 77-38a-302, and 77-27-6. State and
local government agencies that serve victims have the duty to have a
functional knowledge of the procedures established by the Utah Crime
Victims' Reparations Board and to inform victims of these procedures.
(f) Victims and witnesses have a right to have any personal property
returned as provided in Sections 77-24-1 through 77-24-5. Criminal justice
agencies shall expeditiously return the property when it is no longer
needed for court law enforcement or prosecution purposes.
(g) Victims and witnesses have the right to reasonable employer intercession services, including pursuing employer cooperation in minimizing
employees' loss of pay and other benefits resulting from their participation
in the criminal justice process. Officers of the court shall provide these
services and shall consider victims' and witnesses' schedules so that
activities which conflict can be avoided. Where conflicts cannot be avoided,
the victim may request that the responsible agency intercede with
employers or other parties.
(h) Victims and witnesses, particularly children, should have a speedy
disposition of the entire criminal justice process. All involved public
agencies shall establish policies and procedures to encourage speedy
disposition of criminal cases.
(i) Victims and witnesses have the right to timely notice of judicial
proceedings they are to attend and timely notice of cancellation of any
proceedings. Criminal justice agencies have the duty to provide these
notifications. Defense counsel and others have the duty to provide timely
notice to prosecution of any continuances or other changes that may be
required.

(j) Victims of sexual offenses have a right to be informed of their right
to request voluntary testing for themselves for HIV infection as provided
in Section 76-5-503 and to request mandatory testing of the convicted
sexual offender for HIV infection as provided in Section 76-5-502. The law
enforcement office where the sexual offense is reported shall have the
responsibility to inform victims of this right.
(2) Informational rights of the victim under this chapter are based upon the
victim providing his current address and telephone number to the criminal
justice agencies involved in the case.

CHAPTER 38
RIGHTS OF CRIME VICTIMS ACT
77-38-3. Notification to victims — Initial notice, election
to receive subsequent notices — Form of notice
— Protected victim information [Effective until
July 1, 2004].
(1) Within seven days of the filing of felony criminal charges against a
defendant, the prosecuting agency shall provide an initial notice to reasonably
identifiable and beatable victims of the crime contained in the charges, except
as otherwise provided in this chapter.
(2) The initial notice to the victim of a crime shall provide information about
electing to receive notice of subsequent important criminal justice hearings
listed in Subsections 77-38-2(5)(a) through (f) and rights under this chapter.
(3) The prosecuting agency shall provide notice to a victim of a crime for the
important criminal justice hearings, provided in Subsection*77?Q o£S s
through (f) which the victim has requested.
subsections 77-38-2(5)(a)
(4) (a) The responsible prosecuting agency may provide initial and subs*
quent notices in any reasonable manner including telephonically dec"
tronically, orally, or by means of a letter or form prepared for this vurv>o^
(b) In the event of an unforeseen important criminal justice hearing
listed in Subsections 77-38-2(5)(a) through (f) for which a victimhS
requested notice, a good faith attempt to contact the victim by telephone
shall be considered sufficient notice, provided that the prosecuting agency
subsequently notifies the victim of the result of the proceeding.
(5) (a) The court shall take reasonable measures to ensure that its scheduling practices for the proceedings provided in Subsections 77-38-2(5)(a)
through (f) permit an opportunity for victims of crimes to be notified.
(b) The court shall also consider whether any notification system that it
might use to provide notice of judicial proceedings to defendants could be
used to provide notice of those same proceedings to victims of crimes.
(6) A defendant or, if it is the moving party, Adult Probation and Parole,
shall give notice to the responsible prosecuting agency of any motion for
modification of any determination made at any of the important criminal
justice hearings provided in Subsections 77-38-2(5)(a) through (f) in advance of
any requested court hearing or action so that the prosecuting agency may
comply with its notification obligation.
(7) (a) Notice to a victim of a crime shall be provided by the Board of
Pardons and Parole for the important criminal justice hearing provided in
Subsection 77-38-2(5)(g).
(b) The board may provide notice in any reasonable manner, including
telephonically, electronically, orally, or by means of a letter or form
prepared for this purpose.
(8) Prosecuting agencies and the Board of Pardons and Parole are required
to give notice to a victim of a crime for the proceedings provided in Subsections
77-38-2(5)(a) through (f) only where the victim has responded to the initial
notice, requested notice of subsequent proceedings, and provided a current
address and telephone number if applicable.
(9) (a) Law enforcement and criminal justice agencies shall refer any
requests for notice or information about crime victim rights from victims
to the responsible prosecuting agency.

(b) In a case in which the Board of Pardons and Parole is involved, the
responsible prosecuting agency shall forward any request for notice that it
has receivedfroma victim to the Board of Pardons and Parole.
(10) In all cases where the number of victims exceeds ten, the responsible
prosecuting agency may send any notices required under this chapter in its
discretion to a representative sample of the victims.
(11) (a) A victim's address, telephone number, and victim impact statement
maintained by a peace officer, prosecuting agency, Youth Parole Authority,
Division of Youth Corrections, Department of Corrections, and Board of
Pardons and Parole, for purposes of providing notice under this section, is
classified as protected as provided in Subsection 63-2-304(10).
(b) The victim's address, telephone number, and victim impact statement is available only to the following persons or entities in the performance of their duties:
(i) a law enforcement agency, including the prosecuting agency;
(ii) a victims' right committee as provided in Section 77-37-5;
(iii) a governmentally sponsored victim or witness program;
(iv) the Department of Corrections;
(v) Office of Crime Victims' Reparations;
(vi) Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice; and
(vii) the Board of Pardons and Parole.
(12) The notice provisions as provided in this section do not apply to
misdemeanors as provided in Section 77-38-5 and to important juvenile justice
hearings as provided in Section 77-38-2.
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77-38-4, Right to be present and to be heard — Control of
disruptive acts or irrelevant statements — Statements from persons in custody.
(1) The victim of a crime shall have the right to be present at the important
criminal or juvenile justice hearings provided in Subsections 77-38-2(5)(a)
through (f), the right to be heard at the important criminal or juvenile justice
hearings provided in Subsections 77-38-2(5)(b), (c), (d), and (f), and, upon
request to the judge hearing the matter, the right to be present and heard at
the initial appearance of the person suspected of committing the conduct or
criminal offense against the victim on issues relating to whether to release a
defendant or minor and, if so, under what conditions release may occur.
(2) This chapter shall not confer any right to the victim of a crime to be
heard:
(a) at any criminal trial, including the sentencing phase of a capital
trial under Section 76-3-207 or at any preliminary hearing, unless called
as a witness; and
(b) at any delinquency trial or at any preliminary hearing in a minor's
case, unless called as a witness.
(3) The right of a victim or representative of a victim to be present at trial
is subject to Rule 615 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
(4) Nothing in this chapter shall deprive the court of the right to prevent or
punish disruptive conduct nor give the victim of a crime the right to engage in
disruptive conduct.
(5) The court shall have the right to limit any victim's statement to matters
that are relevant to the proceeding.
(6) In all cases where the number of victims exceeds five, the court may limit
the in-court oral statements it receives from victims in its discretion to a few
representative statements.
(7) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a victim's right to be heard
may be exercised at the victim's discretion in any appropriate fashion,
including an oral, written, audiotaped, or videotaped statement or direct or
indirect information that has been provided to be included in any presentence
report.
(8) If the victim of a crime is a person who is in custody as a pretrial
detainee, as a prisoner following conviction for an offense, or as a juvenile who
has committed an act that would be an offense if committed by an adult, or who
is in custody for mental or psychological treatment, the right to be heard under
this chapter shall be exercised by submitting a written statement to the court.
(9) The court may exclude any oral statement from a victim on the grounds
of the victim's incompetency as provided in Rule 601(a) of Utah Rules of
Evidence.
110) Except in juvenile court cases, the Constitution may not be construed
as limiting the existing rights of the prosecution to introduce evidence in
support of a capital sentence.
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P R O C E E D I N G S

MS. BUCHI:

Good morning, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Good morning.

MS. BUCHI:

Your Honor, if we could call Montiel,

No. 21 on your calendar.
THE COURT:

We can.

Let's wait a minute until my

clerk gets back.
MS. BUCHI: Okay.
THE COURT:

We're on No. 21, Alex Montiel.

State of

Utah vs. Alex Montiel, this is Case No. 02190655—or 6524.
It's on for final pre-trial.

We have a trial on next Monday,

I believe.
MS. BUCHI:

It is, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Have we got Alex Montiel?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:

We do, but he says he's

(inaudible)
THE COURT:

No.

MS. BUCHI:

Your Honor, if I can approach.

THE COURT:

All right.

MR. MONTIEL:
THE COURT:

What he has to do is come out.

You are Alex Montiel?

Yes.

All right.

I take it from what you've

handed me, we're going to trial next Monday?
MS. BUCHI: We are prepared to, your Honor.
THE COURT:

The State ready?

2

MR. BURMESTER:
THE COURT:
9:00 o'clock.

Yes, your Honor,

Okay.

Counsel and the defendant here at

You'll have the appropriate attire for Mr.

Montiel?
MS. BUCHI:

Yes, I will, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Okay.

I want everybody here at 9:30

because I'll have the jury up here at 10:00 o'clock ready to
go.
I have the defendant's proposed instructions and
prop sed voir dire and if the State has any instructions, they
can bring them first morning.
Okay.

Anything else we need to talk about in this

case;
MS. BUCHI:

I don't believe so, your Honor.

THE COURT:

State have anything else?

MR. BURMESTER:

Nothing from the State, your Honor.

THE COURT:

See you at 9:30 on Monday.

MS. BUCHI:

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Thank you.

That's all that

I have,

(Off the record.
THE COURT:

Ms. Buchi?

MS. BUCHI:

Good morning, your Honor.

If we could

return to the matter of Alex Montiel, we have a resolution.
THE COURT:

What's the plan here?

3

Give me the file back on Mcrtiel, will you please,
Evelyn?
What's the reason we're doing this?
MR. BURMESTER:
reasons.

Your Honor, there are a couple of

The first is, there are some facts that are—make

the story not as presentable to th«^ jury and I would rather
accept the—the lesser plea than run the risk of (inaudible)
THE COURT:

Well, you—well, you've charged him with

aggravated robbery, a first-degree felony, and that—and the
allegations, as I read the pr'

^e cause statement is that

the defendant used a firearr, wnich would enhance that, and
also that he committed a crime with four other persons, which
would enhance that again.

And—and the State wants to drop

this down to a third-degree felony?
Well, I don't waive firearms enhancements, folks.
You plead them, they're stuck unless I'm convinced that there
was some mistake in pleading.

And this probable cause

statement says that Mr. Montiel produced a gun and held it to
the victim's head and while he was being—while he was being
robbed by the rest of them.
MS. BUCHI:

Your Honor, there's also the additional

reason that Mr. Montiel—Mr. Burmester and I have done prior
to re-trial with Mr. Montiel, he was interested in knowing if
there was any offer and I approached Mr. Burmester and we
talked about it.

I guess in terms of judicial economy as

4

well,
THE COURT:

I don't care about judicial economy when

people are alleged to have used firearms in the commission of
a crime.

I'll take whatever time is necessary to resolve the

issue properly.
I'm not going to waive the firearms enhancement.
Unless you can tell me you don't have any evidence that he
didn't have a firearm or there wasn't a firearm or your
witness is lying.
MR. BURMESTER:

No, your Honor.

matter of weighing—weighing the case.

It's just—just a

I mean, there are

facts—that is the story that is told by the—by the
complaining witness.
THE COURT:

And if it's true, it's a serious crime.

MR. BURMESTER:
THE COURT:

Yeah.

Absolutely.

A bunch of guys jumped this guy walking

down the road and put a gun to his head.
MR. BURMESTER:

Absolutely, your Honor, but there

are also facts and as—as you're well aware with your many
years of experience as a trial lawyer, sometimes it's better
to have the—the verdict in hand than—than two in the bush.
And there's sometimes that the jury may just say, oh, to heck
with this and—and they lose it.
I think this person is a dangerous person. My
objective, I think, and my duties to the taxpayers of the

5

1

State is to take this person, who I believe to be a dangerous

2

person, and lock him up.

3

this i s —

4
5

THE COURT:

That is my objective and I think

Lock him up for zero to five, what kind

of a deal is that?

6

MR. BURMESTER:

It's better than zero to zero, your

7

Honor, and that's—that's just what I—where I'm at, I'm

8

(inaudible)

9

THE COURT:

I assume you've run this by Mr. Yocom?

10

MR. BURMESTER:

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. BURMESTER:

I've run it by Mr. Morgan.

Is he the one that does those things?
Yes.

There—there is a part

13

committee, but in the event we have a short-term situation,

14

then it's—

15

THE COURT:

What does the victim say about this?

16

MR. BURMESTER:

I have not talked to the victim

17

about this particular one, although I've talked to the victim

18

previously about offering a second (inaudible)

19

THE COURT:

Remember the case that Justice Wilkins

20

wrote where he accused the District Attorney's office and the

21

trial judge of running rampant over victim's rights by not

22

telling them what's going on and that little fiasco out in

23

Tooele?

24

again without at least an opportunity to look at this.

25

I don't.

I don't think Mr. Yocom wants to have to undergo that

And I'm not (inaudible).

I know

We haven't even told—we

1

haven't even told the person who claims all these things

2

occurred as to what are you going to do.

3

entitled to know.

4

I think he's

I'm not going to allow the filing of this amended

5

Information at this point and I'm not going to accept any plea

6

to a third-degree felony on the basis of what I've heard.

7

case goes to trial Monday.

8

MR. BURMESTER:

9

MS. BUCHI:

10

Thank you, your Honor.

Thank you, your Honor.

MR. BURMESTER:

Your Honor, I'm not sure if the

11

Court cares, here's a witness list and I know the Court is

12

concerned about that as alleged.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. BURMESTER:

All right.

Very good.

Thank you.

Your Honor, I just didn't—this case

15

is not the usual, so I did not prepared proposed voir dire.

16

I—(inaudible) the Court stocks.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. BURMESTER:

19

THE COURT:

20

I

I'm sure we can cover that.
Thank you.

See you Monday.

(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)

21
22
23
24
25

|

The

* * *

Thank you.
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